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SHORE 
In November 1974, resp stockholders of petr 
Parkland Hosiery Co. brought a class action against petrs, the Company 
and 12 of its officers, directors, and stockholders, alleging the vio-
lation of various security law provisions in the issuance of a proxy 
statement on a proposed merger that was ultimately comple~ed7 resp 
sought damages, the rescision of the merger, ' and other such relief as 




might be granted. In May of 1976, befo~e the above case came up for 
trial, the SEC brought an action against petrs in federal DC alleging 
identical violations of the security laws and seeking various forms 
of equitable relief. The SEC action came to trial a month later; on 
November 9, 1976, the DC, sitting without a jury, issued an opinion 
finding in favor of the SEC. Resps immediately moved for summary --
judgment in their class action urging collateral estoppel. Petrs 
opposed the motion on the ground that they were entitled to a ~ 
trial of the issued previously decided without a jury in the SEC suit; 
a jury trial had not been possible in the SEC action because of its 
equitable nature. The DC [Wyatt, S.D.N.Y.] agreed and denied resps' 
\ .... motion for summary judgment. On an interlocutory appeal, the CA 2 
reversed and ordered summary judgment to be issued. The issue presented 
by this petn is the same as the question certified to the CA 2: 
r ~ in 
"Whether the court's findings of fact in a 
prior action commenced by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission can, by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, be applied to a subsequent 
action by a different plaintiff, seeking leqal 
and equitable relief, based on the same trans-
actions as was the action commenced by the ,SEC, 
when there was no right to a jury trial in that 
action?" 
2. PRIOR DECISIONS: The collateral effect, if any, of a judgment 
an SEC suit on a later related damage action brought by private 
Vl plaintiffs has been considered by prior courts. In Rachal v. Hill, 
435 F.2d 59 (1970), cert. denied, 403 u.s. 904 (1971), a panel of the 
CA 5 [Gewin, Morgan & Adams, CA 3] held under almost identical facts 
- 3 -
that a defendant in a damage action does not "lose his constitutional 
right to a trial by jury by estoppel when the issue to be decided has 
been adjudicated adversely to him in a prior proceeding at which there 
was no right to a trial by jury and his present adversary was not a 
party." Id. at 63. In reaching this conclusion, theCA 5 was strongly 
influenced by the decisions of this Court holding that when an equitable 
claim and a legal claim, the resolution of which depend on the deter-
mination of a common factual issue, are joined in the same action, the 
common issue must be first tried before a jury, even if the equitable 
claim was brought first or if the legal claim is merely incidental to 
the equitable. See, ~· Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 
(1959} • The CA 5 concluded that the strong interest in preserving the 
defendant's right to a jury trial that was demonstrated in these cases 
militated against application of collateral estoppel under the cir-
cumstances of the case. 
While no other CA has had to directly rule on the issue presented 
by Rachal and the instant case, several other CAs have cited Rachel 
with apparent approval. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 
504 F.2d 101, 111 n.7 (CA 7 1974}; Lynn Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston 
Print Works co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1184 (CA 3 1972}. The Des have appar-
ently consistently followed theCA 5's decision in Rachal. See cases 
cited on p. 9 of the Petition. 
3. THE DECISION BELOW: The CA 2 began by noting that, if it 
were not for Rachal, collateral estoppel would clearly .apply on the 
- 4 -
facts of this case. The issues were the same and petrs were accorded 
a full and fair opportunity to try those issues in the prior proceeding. 
Nor would the absence of mutuality of parties prevent the application 
of collateral estoppel, in light of Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (}971). (Petrs do not 
challenge this portion of the CA 2's holding.) 
Turning to the jury trial issue, the CA 2 explicitly refused to 
follow theCA S's decision in Rachal. Beacon Theatres, in the view of 
the CA 2, was not in point. "If anything, Beacon Theatres implicitly 
confirms the long-accepted principle that a non-jury adjudication of 
issues asserted in an equitable claim will collaterally estop a later 
jury trial of the same issues presented by the same party in a legal 
claim. Had it not been for that basic assumption the Supreme Court 
would not have been concerned about the order in which the legal and 
equitable claims were to be tried, since the defendant would then have 
been guaranteed a jury trial of the counterclaim regardless of the out-
come of the equitable claim." TheCA 2 also cited a long string of 
cases for the proposition that, at least where there was mutuality of 
parties, the mere fact that a prior proceeding was equitable in nature 
has never beenthought to bar application of collateral estoppel or res 
judicata. See p. 7a of the Petition. 
In theCA 2's view, more than offsetting the defendants' interest 
in a jury trial (as recognized in Rachal and Beacon Theatres\ were the 
policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Adherence to 
( 
- 5 -
the CA 5 's opinion in Rachal "would violate basic principles of fair-
ness, finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial resources, 
avoidance of possibly inconsistent results, and achievement of the 
'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' " 
~r 
Petitioners' prL1cipjA' argument was that historically they would 
not have been collaterally estopped under the circumstances of this 
-i 
case (since the common law in 1791 did not require mutuality of parties) -
and thus, they would have been entitled to a jury trial. Under this 
Court's decision in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 u.s. 474 (1935), the historic 
contours of the common law right to a jury trial must be preserved. 
The CA 2 disagreed. First, such a strict historical approach to inter-
preting the Seventh Amendment had in their view been weakened by this 
court's decision in Ros~ v. Bernhard, 396 u.s. 531 (1970). Furthermore, 
even "a strict historical standard would not mandate a jury retrial 
of the present case. Dimick involved a suit for damages for personal 
injuries of the cornmon garden-variety type that had long existed at 
common law prior to 1791 and had always been triable by jury. Moreover, 
the pre-1791 law clearly prohibited the Court from increasing a jury 
award in such a case. In the present case, on the other hand, we find 
no 18th Century counterpart or analogue to an SEC proceeding for in-
junctive relief or a stockholders' suit based on an implied right of 
action created by antifraud provisions of federal securities laws." 
Thus, in the CA 2's view, it was impossible to determine whether the 
common law would have eased collateral estoppel under the circumstances 
( 
- 6 -
of this case and allowed the entry of summary judgment. 
The CA 2 noted finally that, even if under certain circumstances 
considerations of fairness would preclude collaterally estopping a 
defendant from relitigating issues that had been previously litigated 
in a non-jury proceeding, petrs had "made no effort to protect their 
right to a jury trial of the damage claims asserted by [resps], either 
by seeking to expedite trial of the present action or by requesting 
[the judge in the SEC action], in the exercise of his discretion 
pursuant to Rule 39(b), (c), F.R. Civ. P., to order that the issues in 
the SEC case be tried by a jury or before an advisory jury." 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend that the CA 2 abridged their 
historical right to a jury trial under the circumstances of this case. 
Before the demise of the doctrine of mutuality of parties, a jury trial 
would clearly have been required. Modifications in the scope of 
collateral estoppel cannot cut back on the right to a jury trial 
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. In addition to being wrong, the 
decision of the CA 2 directly conflicts with the decision of another 
of 
circuit and is/obvious general imp.ortance. 
Petrs also defend their failure to try and preserve their right 
to a jury trial until after the SEC action had been completed. The 
damage action could not have been expedited because the parties were 
not yet ready for trial. The SEC action could not have been deferred 
(.,.,...., because of the "well-established policy requiring SEC enforcement 




cases cited at pp. 23-24 of the Petition. Finally, the DC did not 
have the authority to try the SEC action before a jury and the use of 
an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 39{c) would not have 
satisfied petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 
Resps merely echoe the logic of the CA 2. Resps do not contest 
that there is a conflict in the CAs and that the issue presented by 
this petn has major ramifications. Resps do argue that the Court may 
wish to wait for a later case in which thepetrs attempted, but were 
unable, to either delay the SEC action or expedite the private damage 
action, thus eliminating any possible issue of "waiver." 
5. DISCUSSION: The issue presented is not easy. I am not really 
convinced by petrs "historical" argument. Petrs would not only freeze 
the common law rules as to when a jury trial is required, but would 
also freeze any rules -- including collateral estoppel -- that might 
influence when there is a jury trial. The question here is not whether 
petrs are entitled to a jury determination of any issues presented by 
the case, but what issues petrs are free to present in light of the 
previous litigation. 
On the other hand, however, petrs would have been entitled to a 
jury trial if the SEC action had not intervened. Despite the impli-
cations of the CA 2 to the contrary, there would appear to have been 
little petrs could have done to prevent the SEC action from intervening 
( or otherwise preserve their right to a jury trial. Petrs' loss of 
their right to a jury trial is obviously troubling given its importance 
in the scheme of the Seventh Amendment. 
- 8 -
Given the conflict in the CAs, and the importance of the issue, 
this might well be a grant. 
There is a response. 
4/20/78 
CMS 
Thompson Op in petn. 
t'ourt ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Suhmitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell 
Re: Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., et al. v. Shore, 
certiorari to the CA2 (Mansfield, Timbers, Dooling (of 
E.D.N.Y. by designation)) 
I. FACTS 
In October 1974 petitioner Parklane effected a merger 
that converted it into a privately owned company controlled in 
part by petitioner Somekh. In order to obtain the 
shareholders' approval for this merger, the officers of the 
company issued a proxy statement describing the terms of the 
transaction and advising the shareholders of a meeting that 
would be held on October 14 to consider the merger proposal. 
After the merger was consummated, one of Parklane's former 
minority shareholders, the respondent, brought a class action 
suit under the Securities and Exchange Act against Parklane and --
twelve of its officers, directors, and shareholders in the 
S.D.N.Y., alleging that the 1974 proxy statement had been false 
and misleading in three respects. The complaint asked for 
damages, rescission of the merger, and costs. 
~ 
56 ~11 ~~dJ-1..-
In May 1976, while the petitioners and respondent were 
in the middle of discovery, the SEC sought an injunction 
...._,_ - ,__ .......... 
against Parklane in the S.D.N.Y. The Commission made __, 
~ 
~~~ es~entially th~me al~ns that the respondent had made 
~~~ in his complaint. After a four day trial at which the 
~ petitioners appeared as defendants and actively participated, 
the district court ruled for the SEC, finding that the proxy 
statement had failed to make adequate disclosure with respect 
to each of the three subjects alleged. Moreover, the court 
found these nondisclosures to have been material. The second 
circuit affirmed. 
~ The respondent then moved for partial summary judgment 
4~ ~-
~~ 1 in his ongoing private action against Parklane and its 
~· ~ officers. The respondent assserted that the rulings of the 
~-~ ~t in the SEC action collaterally estopped the petitioners 
~~~om relitigating those issues. Relying on Rachal v. Hill, 435 
·~ ~2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), the district court denied the motion, 
7-~~ that no collateral estoppel effect could be given the 
~ ~~GD~~~prior action, as the petitioners had not been 
~ ~ll~rg~e those issues to a jury. 
2. 
After certification of an interlocutory appeal under 
28 U.S.C. §1292(b), the second circuit reversed the district 
court. The court stated that equity judgments have long been 
~11 ~~ 
~~~ 
taken to preclude retrial of certain issues. Such collateral 
~-~~~e~-os torpl'pgehlt is~~t ~~dds with the- seven~ amendment, as there is 
~~ ~- L to have a jury Jdecide questions with respect to which 
~ r1 there is no disputed isk ue of fact; where a party has had a 
nv0 ~~ full and fair oppor~unity to litigate an issue in an equity 
~ ~~0 ~proceeding, there remains no disputed issue of fact for the 
3. 
jury's consideration. 
~~~ The court recognized that its ruling was directly ~ 
~v- contrary to the fifth circuit's decision i~Rachal v. Hill, 4) 5 -
F.2d 59 (1970). The court found the reliance in Rachal on this 
Court's decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 u.s. 
500 (1959) misplaced. In Beacon Theatres the Court ruled that 
when a single action involves questions for a jury and 
questions for the court, the court must take pains that the 
former are decided first, so as not to interfere with the 
parties' seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The second 
circuit opined that implicit in Beacon Theatres was the maxim 
that if a question is decided by a judge, collateral estoppel 
will preclude future consideration of that issue by a jury. 
Finally, although the court admitted that courts 
sometimes had determined the scope of the seventh amendment by 
reference to the right to jury trial as of 1791, the court 
found such reference unhelpful here. Thus, it is not apparent 
what courts of law in 1791 would have done with a judgment 
resulting from an SEC enforcement action. Similarly, it is 
impossible to discern how courts of law would have reacted if 
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel had been abandoned. 
li. CONTENTIONS 
The petitioners make four basic claims. First, they 
argue that insofar as collateral estoppel may limit the issues 
presented to a jury, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
applied must be that in force in 1791--the time of the 
enactment of the seventh amendment. Second, they argue that 
the second circuit here misinterpreted this Court's ruling in 
Beacon Theatres. Third, they argue that, quite apart from __, 
constitutional requirements, collateral estoppel should not be 
applied in cases such as the one at hand because "justice and 
equity" are at odds with depriving individuals such as the 
petitioners of their opportunity to be heard by a jury. 
Finally, the petitioners contend that the second circuit was 
mistaken in suggesting that they had not done everything 
practicable to secure a jury ruling in their case. 
The respondents dispute each of the petitioners' 
contentions. Most important, they argue that the courts always 
have been willing to make accomodation under the seventh 
amendment for changes in procedure, and that the shift away 
from the mutuality requirement in collateral estoppel should be 
no exception / 
The SG has filed an amicus brief on behalf of the SEC. 
The Commission in concerned with the possible effect this case 
might have on its enforcement proceedings. The SG argues that 
under present collateral estoppel doctrine the petitioners 
would be precluded from relitigating issues decided against it 
in the SEC action. Thus, the only question is whether the 
seventh amendment requires deviation from the normal doctrine 
4. 
of collateral estoppel. In 1791 a ruling in equity could estop 
questions presented at law. That mutuality of estoppel was 
required in 1791 is irrelevant, as the courts consistently have 
allowed the adoption of modern procedural rules even when it 
means taking issues away from the jury. See, e.g., Galloway v. 
United States, 319 u.s. 372, 390-91 (1943)(upholding the 
granting of summary judgments and directed verdicts). 
Finally, however, the government takes issue with the second 
circuit's intimation that it would have been appropriate for 
the district court that heard the SEC enforcement action to 
stay the injunctive proceedings in order to afford the 
petitioners time to go to trial with their action at law. The 
SG argues that the the efficacy of SEC enforcement actions 
would be curtailed sharply if they were delayed for long 
periods of time. 
The~shinton Legal Foundation (WLF) also has filed a 
brief amicus. WLF argues that the second circuit's ruling here 
places businesses in a difficult dilemma: They either can 
~
litigate claims raised by government agencies in enforcement 
actions (as Parklane did here) and risk huge liability through 
the action of collateral estoppel in subsequent private class 
action suits, or they can settle the government action despite 
weaknesses in the government's case. Thus, WLF contends that 
the true effect of the ruling below will be the coercion o 
settlements favorable to the government in future enforcement 
actions. Moreover. WLF is concerned that the doctrine 
announced here may extend as well to afford collateral estoppel 




A. Arguments for Reversal 
I see two strong arguments for reversal of the second 
------~-----------------
circuit here: (1) application of collateral estoppel in cases 
such as this is directly contrary to the purpose of the seventh 
amendment--preservation of the right to jury trial as it 
existed in 1791; and (2) quite apart from any constitutional 
concerns, the second circuit's ruling interferes with the 
substantial federal policy in favor of jury trials. 
1. History 
The seventh amendment provides that, 
[i]n suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved •••• 
Because the constitutional language speaks of "preserving" the 
right to a jury trial, the courts have looked to the scope of 
the right to jury trial in 1791 (the year the seventh amendment 
was adopted) in determining the scope of the present-day right. 
See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935)("In order to 
ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, 
resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law 
established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional 
provision in 1791"). 
Whether courts of law would give collateral estoppel 
effect to judgments of courts of equity in 1791 may be open to 
question. It is certain, however, that in 1791 neither party 
could use a prior judgment as determinative of an issue in a _ _:__.-----------
second action unless both parties were bound by the prior 
judgment; this doctrine was known as "mutuality of estoppel." 
6. 
Resp here was not a party to the SEC enforcement action against 
petrs, and therefore could not have been bound by an adverse 
judgment in the first action. Thus, in 1791 resp could not 
have invoked collateral estoppel in the second, private action, 
and petrs therefore would have had the right to present to the 
jury each of the issues already litigated to the court in the 
prior action. In this way, the second circuit by its ruling 
here has deprived petrs of a right to jury trial that it would 
.... -- ~----
have had at common law in 1791, and the ruling therefore is at 
odds with the seventh amendment. 
2. Policy 
A second argument for reversal of the second circuit 
is based favoring jury trials in civil 
cases, rather than on the seventh amendment right to such 
trials. The Court recognized this substantial federal interest 
in~yrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 
U.S. 525 (1958). Byrd was a diversity action in which the 
defendant posed an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's tort 
action which required a determination whether the plaintiff was 
a statutory employee under South Carolina law. South Carolina 
courts had ruled that this question was one for the court to 
decide, rather than the jury. Although the Court admitted that 
trial to the court rather than to a jury could affect the 
outcome of the suit, it concluded that the federal district 
court should allow the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was 
a statutory employee. The Court ruled that the "federal policy 
favoring jury determinations" should take precedence over the 
normal rule under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 u.s. 64 (1938) 
that state law govern questions that are likely to affect the 
7. 
outcome of a diversity action. Byrd, therefore, demonstrates 
that there is a strong federal policy interest in allowing 
parties in federal courts to present their claims to juries. 
In discarding the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, 
------~ . ....___,___...__ 
the courts have not ruled that prior judgments invariably can 
be asserted against parties to the first suit. Rather, the 
courts have indic~ed that whether collateral estoppel applies 
v 
must depend on a "sense of justice and equity." Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, In. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 
u.s. 313, 334 (1971). See also, Berner v. British 
Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir. 
1965)(refusing to apply collateral estoppel where the result 
would be "unfair"). Moreover, there has been particular 
concern over the fairness of applying non-mutual collateral 
estoppel "offensively"-~that is, where, as here, the party 
against whom the estoppel is asserted was a losing defendant in 
the first action. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest 
Brews, 53 Calif.L.Rev. 25, 37 (1965). One factor that should 
be taken into account in determining the fairness of non-mutual 
collateral estoppel is the federal policy expressed in Byrd of 
allowing federal parties to present their claims to a jury. 
Thus, even if the seventh amendment does not forbid collateral 
estoppel of issues determined at a prior equitable action, 
collateral estoppel nonetheless is improper because it would 
impinge on a fundamental federal policy. Indeed, this is 
precisely the conclusion of one lower federal court. See 




I can see two main arguments for affirmance: ( 1 ) 
' 
allowing relitigation of issues determined by a court is 
wasteful; and (2) fairness does not require that a party have a 
chance to litigate a second time an issue he already has had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate. 
1. Policy Behind Collateral Estoppel 
Perhaps the most important policy underlying 
collateral estoppel is judicial economy. See Semmel, 
Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 
Colum.L.Rev. 1457 (1968). This interest is strongly implicated 
when a court in an SEC enforcement action has determined issues 
adverse to the defendant, who subsequently is sued by a private 
plaintiff. Thus, it would be a waste of scarce judicial 
resources to allow defendants such as petrs here to obtain a 
second trial on issues already finally decided. See Note, The 
Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation: 
Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 
43 Chi.L.Rev. 338 (1976). The waste is particularly acute in 
cases such as the one at bar, where complex factual situations 
often make for long and complicated trials. 
2. Fairness 
There is no reason not to estop collaterally petrs 
from relitigating the issues decided in the SEC enforcement 
action. Thus, petrs were aware of the ongoing suit for damages 
brought against them by resps when they were litigating the SEC 
action; there is no danger, therefore, that petrs did not fully 
litigate the first action because they were unaware of its 
possible ramifications. Moreover, the SEC action was important 
enough in its own right to remove any danger that petrs would 
10 • 
take it lightly. 
' Some commentators have expressed concern at the 
prospect of plaintiffs "sitting on the sidelines," hoping to be 
able to use a favorable judgment, while knowing that an 
unfavorable judgment will not be used against them. See 
Semmel, supra, at 1473. There is no danger of that here, 
however, as resps had no choice but to stay out of the SEC 
action--they could not have intervened even if they had so 
desired 
C. My Analysis { ~~} 
1. History 
Although I have done no original historical research, 
I am persuaded from that of others that in 1791 judgments of 
equity courts were given collateral estoppel effect by courts 
of law, even though this meant that some issues were not 
presented to the jury that otherwise would be. In Shapiro & 
Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A 
Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 442 (1971) the 
authors found indications in several English and American 
treatises and cases supporting this view. Moreover, the one 
law clerk this year trained in legal history (Jack Pratt from 
the Chief Justice's chambers) tells me that on the whole he is 
persuaded by the work of Shapiro and Coquillette. Finally, it 
v 
appears that the Court has assumed that equitable judgments can 
estop the relitigation of issues in subsequent legal actions. 
See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1966). 
The historical question, therefore, is whether 
collateral estoppel effect should be given the equitable 
judgment even in the absence of mutuality of the parties. To 
1 1 • 
me it is not enough to say that, if this action had arisen in 
1791, then Parklane would have been allowed to present its case 
to a jury. Such a strict, limited view of the historical 
limitations of the seventh amendment is simply impossible to 
apply in most cases; there have been too many changes in the 
law since 1791 and too many situations have arisen that were 
beyond the wildest dreams of the Framers of that constitutional 
provision. Thus, I believe that the question more properly 
stated is whether allowing collateral estoppel in the absence 
of mutuality affects "the basic institution of jury trial 
in ••• its most fundamental elements." Galloway v. Uni~ed 
States, 319 u.s. 372, 392 (1943). I believe it does not: The 
problem perceived with non-mutual estoppel in the eighteenth 
century was not that it would interfere with the right to jury 
trial, but rather that it was unfair that a party could 
benefit, but not lose, by the judgment in a prior action. See 
Shapiro & Coquillette, supra. 
There is a second reason why I am reluctant to 
overrule the second circuit's ruling here on the basis of 
history: The task of interpreting the seventh amendment in 
light of what lawyers two hundred years ago would think of 
procedural innovations is too difficult and dangerous to 
produce results with which one is entirely comfortable. Thus, 
others who have attempted the job have observed that there are 
few reported decisions concerning the scope of the right to 
jury trial in 1791, and the procedures varied substantially 
among the states. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra. Indeed, 
this Court has noted that interpreting the seventh amendment 
leads to an "extensive and possibly abstruse historical 
1 2. 
inquiry." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 u.s. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
Last, I must confess to some skepticism concerning the 
pertinence of a strict historical analysis of the right to jury 
trial in the eighteenth century. The world--and particularly 
the world of civil procedure--has changed so much in the last 
two hundred years that I question whether we even can ask 
sensibly what eightenth century lawyers would have done in a 
modern context. My confessed bias, therefore, is to adhere 
only to the basic "law/equity" distinction present in 1791; 
beyond that I would seek to formulate a rule that makes sense, 
absent some overwhelming historical evidence to the contrary. 
2. Collateral Estoppel vs. Seventh Amendment 
The question, therefore, is whether the interest in 
affording people an opportunity to present their case to a jury 
outweighs the interests protected by collateral estoppel--in 
particular, the promotion of judicial economy. Contrary to what 
both petrs and resp suggest, I do not think Beacon Theatres 
answers this question. In Beacon, as here, the Court was 
confronted with a conflict between the right to jury trial and 
the operation of collateral estoppel. To resolve this 
conflict, the Court could have compromised the right to jury 
trial by saying that the trial court could decide the equitable 
issues first and apply collateral estoppel to avoid the jury's 
reconsideration of common issues; alternatively, the Court 
could havP compromised the exercise of collateral estoppel by 
saying that the trial court could determine equitable issues 
first but could not apply collateral estoppel to take common 
issues away from the jury. Rather than choose either of these 
extremes, however, the Court determined that collateral 
1 3. 
estoppel should apply, but that the trial court had to preserve 
the right to jury trial by submitting common issues to the jury 
ZM--~~~ 
first. In this way the CourtAavoided the direct clash between 
the seventh amendment and collateral estoppel. (This is the 
source of the confusion between the second and fifth circuits: 
The former seized upon the deference shown collateral estoppel 
in Beacon Theatres; the latter seized upon the deference shown 
the right to jury trial--both courts were, in a sense, right.) 
To my mind, the interests promoted by collateral 
estoppel outweigh the interest in trial to a jury in civil 
cases. The efficiency of deciding issues once, where it is 
fair to do so, is apparent and results in substantial savings 
to the judicial system. On the other hand, the courts in other 
contexts have not hesitated to take away from defendants their 
right to trial by a jury of some issues. Thus, before merger 
of law and equity, it appears that plaintiffs were given 
absolute discretion to sue first in equity and, if successful, 
subsequently bring an action at law involving the same claims. 
See Comment, 40 Cin.L.Rev. 373 (1971). If such a practice was 
consistent with the protection of the seventh amendment right 
to jury trial, then it is hard to understand why any 
substantial constitutional interest is implicated in the case 
at hand. 
Accordingly, I would conclude that history is 
uninformative and may fairly be read to be consistent with the 
decision below. Moreover, apart from history, the decision 
below is justified, as the interests protected by a consistent 
collateral estoppel doctrine override any interest in trial of 
issues to a jury when a party already has had a full and fair 
1 4. 
opportunity to litigate those issues. 
3. Policy 
Having concluded that the seventh amendment does not 
preclude application of collateral estoppel here, I must 
confess that I nonetheless am vaguely troubled by the possible 
ramifications of the ruling below. I believe, however, that my 
concern has little to do with the right to jury trial. Rather, 
I fear that exorbitant liabilities will now be imposed on 
defendants to SEC (and other government) actions because class 
action plaintiffs will be able to gain a "free ride" following 
a successful government enforcement suit. If this liabilty 
were truly imposed to recompense plaintiffs for actual loss, 
perhaps I would not be disturbed. A substantial portion of' the 
liability imposed under the antitrust and securities laws, 
however, is meant to encourage "private attorneys general": 
such private enforcement is entirely inappropriate on the heels 
of a government enforcement action. This danger, of course, is 
present whether a jury trial is involved or not: it is inherent 
in use of non-mutual collateral estoppel "offensively" (that 
is, against an unsuccessful defendant in the first action).* 
As I have noted, courts and commentators have dealt 
with this problem in the past, usually when there are many 
*/Similarly, amicus WLF's concern that the second circuit's ..... 
ruling here will coerce settlements has nothing to do with jury 
trials. Whenever collateral estoppel effect is given to a 
judgment, that judgment takes on added importance and the 
incentive to settle a weak case is thereby increased. 
• l •• 
15. 
potential plaintiffs and a single defendant (as, for example, 
in an air disaster). Commentators have suggested that in such 
situations collateral estoppel should not be applied at all, 
see Semmel, supra, or that it should not be applied 
"offensively," see, Currie, supra. The courts, however, have 
been content to include a caveat that collateral estoppel in 
such situations should be applied only when it is fair to do 
so. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific 
Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965). Perhaps this will 
be enough to avoid draconian uses of the power given private 
plaintiffs by the second circuit here. 
***** 
In sum, I believe there i~o seventh amendment difficulty with 
giving collateral estoppel effect to prior government 
enforcement actions in subsequent private actions for damages. 
Although I am somewhat concerned over the possible 
ramifications of such a use of collateral estoppel, this 
concern sterns from the present doctrine of collateral estoppel--
not from a concern over the use of juries. Moreover, it may be 
that present safeguards are sufficient to protect defendants 
from unfair uses of collateral estoppel.** 
10/27/78 David 
**/The second circuit's reference in its opinion to the 
possibility of staying future SEC enforcement actions in cases 
such as this pertains to the question of waiver of the seventh 
amendment right to trial by jury, should it exist. As I 
believe there is no such right, there is no need for the Court 
to consider the propriety of this dictum. In any event, if 
trial courts in the future follow the suggestion of the second 
circuit and improperly stay SEC actions, the Court may review 
the question on appeal from those stays; there is no need to 
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No. 77- 1305 
Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., I On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Second 
Leo M . Shore. Circuit. 
[December -, 1978,] 
MR. JusTICJ<j STEWART deliver<'d the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents tlw question whether a party who has 
had issues of fact adjudicated advPrsely to it in an equitable 
nction may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same 
issues bC'fore a jury in a subs<'quent legal action with a new 
party. 
The respondent brought this stockholder's class action 
against the petitioners in a federal district court. The com-
plaint alleged that the petitiotwrs, Parklane Hosiery Com-
pany, Inc. (Parklane) and 12 of its officers. directors. and 
stockholders. had issued a mat<'rially false and misle3.(Jing 
proxy statRme11t in comH'ction with a merger. 1 The proxy 
statement. according to th<' complaint. had violated~~ 14 (a), 
10 (b). and 20 (a) of tlw Aeruriti<'s Exchange Act. of 1934. 
48 Stat. 8~)5. 891. 800. as anwnded. 15 F. S. C. ~~ 78n (a). 
78.! (b), and 78t (a), as well as various rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
1 Thr amrndrd complaint allr~l'd that tiH' prox~· ~faf('llH'Ilt that had 
IH'('JJ i~surd to 1hr ~foekholdrr~ wa~ fal~r :tnd mi~lrndin11: hre:111~r it fni!Pd 
to di~c·los<' : (J) thnt thr Prr~idrnf of P:trklnnr would finnnri:tll.\· brn('fif a~ 
n rr~ulf of thP compan~· ,going prwafr : (:!) cc•rfain ongoing nrgofiation~ 
that eould ha,·r rrsultc·d in finarH·i:tl lwnd1t to Parklnne, :1nd (~) that 
thr apprai:<nl uf fhf' fair ntlue of P:nklanc· ~rock wa . .; ha~rd on in:<nllicic•nt 
informal ron t.o hr accurate. 
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(SEC). The complaint sought damages, recission of the 
merger, and r<"covery of costs. 
Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against 
the same defendants in a federal district court, a::Ileging that 
the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was 
materially false and misleading in essentially the same 
respects as those that had bee11 alleged in the respondent's 
complaint. Injunctive relief was requested. After a four-
day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement 
was materially~ 1msleailing in tlie respects alleg~d, 
and enterea a aeclaratory JUdgment to that effect. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422' 
F. Supp. 477. The Court of Appeals for the Second C'ircuit 
affirmed this judgment. 558 F. 2d 1083. 
Th<' respondent in the present case then moved for partial 
summary judgment against the petitiouers. asserting that the 
petitioners wer<' collatRrally Pstopped from relitigating the 
issues that had been r<'solved against them iu the action 
brought by the SEC.2 ThP District Court denied the motion 
on the ground that such an application of collatRral estoppel 
would deny the petition('J'S thPir Seventh Amendment right to 
a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second C'ircuit 
reversed. holding that a party who has had issues of fact deter-
mined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
in a nonj ury trial is collaterally Pstopped from obtaining a 
subsequent jury trial of these same issuPs of fact. 565 F. 2d 
815. The appellate court concluded that "the Seventh 
Amendment preserves the right to jury trial only with respect 
2 A J>rivatr plaint itT in an ac-tion undPr thr prox~· rulp:; i8 not Pntit!Pd 
to rPiiPf ~imp!~· by dPmonstrating th:tt the proxy solicitation wns materially 
fa]:;p and mi~leading. Thr plaintiff must :d;;o ~how that hr was injurPd and 
prOV(' unmnges. Mills \' . Electl·ir· Auto-Lite, 396 11. S. :li5, :386-:390. 
Smc<' the SEC aet ion wa:s limit Pel to a ddermination of whC'thrr tlw proxy 
stntemPnt~ <"OiltainPcl mah'riall~ · false nncl misle::din11: :statement:;, th~· 
rpsponclrnt roJl(•eciPd that hP would still hn ve to prove thcs«> otlwr ele- . 
mrnt s of his prima fnci<' ra~<' in thr private aetion . 
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to issues of fact, [and] once those issues have been fully and 
fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding, uothing remains for 
trial, either with or without a. jury." !d., at 819. Because of 
an intercircuit conflict,a we granted certiora.ri. - U. S. -. 
I 
The threshold question to be considered is whether, quite 
apart from the right to a. jury trial under the Seventh Amend-
ment, the petitioners can bf' precluded from relitigating facts 
resolved adversely to them in a prior equitable proceeding 
with a.nother pa.rty under the general law of collateral estQP-
pel. Specifically, we must determine whether a litigant who 
;as not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that 
judgment "offeJlsively'' to pn'vent a defendant from relitigat-
ing issues resolved in the earlier proceeding.4 
A 
Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata,r.· 
3 The position of !IJP Court of Apprub for thr SPcond Circuit i;,; in con-
Hict. with t hnt takrn b~· thr Court of Appmli:i for the Fifth Circ·uit in 
Rachal , .. //ill. -l-35 F . 2cl 59. 
'1 In thi~ contrxt, offen;;iv<' u;,;r of collntpral rstoppel occur" when the 
_plaintiff ~l'rk:-: to foreclose the defendant from litigating an i~sue the 
defendant haR prrviously litigated un::;urces~fully in an action with anotheF 
party. Drfrn~ivr u:;r occur~ when a clefcnclant SE:'eks to prevent a. plain-
tiff from a~:;erting a claim the pbintiff has previously litigated and lost 
against a not hrr defrnclant. 
r. Unde-•r thr doctrine of rr:; judicata, a juclgmrnt on the merit:; iu a prior 
suit bar~ n "rcond suit involving thP ~anw parties or tht'ir privie:; basref 
on the• HHiliP <'HIN' of net ion. Under t hl' cloct rinr of colbteral estoppel, 
on thr other hand, thr ~f'cond aetion is upon n cliti'erf'nt cau:;e of action 
and the• judgnwnt. in thr prior ~nit prrdude,; rrlitigation of i~suei:i actually 
litigated :mel nece.~sar~ · to the outcomr l>f the first action . lB . .T. Moore, 
Fcclernl Practice 1T 0.405!11, at R22-824 (2cl rd. 1974); e. g., Lawlor v. 
Natirmal Screen Serv. Corp .. 349 U.S. a22, ;3:26 (1955); Commissioner v·. 
Sw111e11. :~:3:~ P. 1::1. 591, .597 (194Fl); Cron!U'ell "· Count11 of .Sac, 94 U.s·. 
~51, !352-:35!3 (181()). 
77-1305-0PINION 
4 PARKLANE HOSU .. RY CO. v. SHORE 
has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden 
of relitigating an idPntical issu~ with the same party or his 
privy and of promoting .i udicial economy by preventing need~ 
less litigation. Blonder- 'l'ongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313. 328-329. Until 
relatively recently, however. the scope of collateral estoppel 
was limited by the doctrine of mutuality of parties. Under 
this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior judg-
ment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were 
bound by the judgment.n Based on the premise that it is 
somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment 
when he himself would not be so bound,7 the mutuality 
requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a 
previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues 
with new parties. 
By failing to recognize the obvious difference in position \ 
between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who 
has fu]]y litigated and lost. the mutuality requirement was 
criticized almost from its inception.8 Recognizing the validity 
G E. a., HigeiO'Il' Y. Old Domiu·ion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127 ("It 
i ~ a. principle of general elementary law that, estoppel of a judgment, must, 
be mutual."): Buckelfl' Puwder C'o. \'.E. l. du Punt de NPnww·s Powder 
Co., 248 U. S. 53, 6:1; Re,.;tutcmrnt of Judgments§ 93 (1942). 
7 It is a ,·iolat ion of due> proce~,; for a jndgmeht to be binding on a liti-
gnnt who was uoi a part.'· nor a Jlri,·)· and thert'fore ha,.; JHw~>r had an 
opportunity to lw heard. BlondN-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University 
of Illinois Foundation. 402 U. S. 313, 329; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 
:~2, 40. 
8 This rrit icbm wa~ ~ummariz<'d in t.hr Court's opinion in Blonder-
'l'ongue Laboratories. hu·. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 
313, :t22-:3:27 . The opinion of Ju~ticc Traynor for a unanimous Cabfornia 
Supreme Comt h1 Bemlwrd v. Bank of .4merica Nat. 'f'r·ust· & Savings 
.4.~sll .. 19 Cal. 2d S07, 812. 1:22 P . 2d 89:.?, 895 (1942), madr the point 
:Hlrcinclly : 
•· xo sati8fartory rationaliza1ion has brcn advanced for a rf'f]uin•mrni of 
mutunllty . Ju~1 why a party who wn:; not, bound by a pn'viou~ action 
Hhould be precluded from a::;:,;erting it a;; rPs judicata again,;t a pnrty wlm 
wa,.; bound by 1t is diffieult to comprehend." 
77-1305-0PU\ION 
PARKLA~:E HOSIEHY CO. v . SHORE 
of this criticism, the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. U11iversity of Il linois Founda,tion, supra, abandoned the 
mutuality requirement, at least in cases where a pa.teuteo 
seeks to reiTtigate tfi'e validity of a patent after a federal court 
in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid." The 
"broader question" before the Court, however, was "whether 
it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full 
and fair opportunity for judicial rrsolution of the same issue." 
!d., at 328. The Court stro11gly suggested a negative answer 
to that question: 
11In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the 
mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete 
def<"nse on thr merits to a claim which the plaintiff has 
fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is au argua-
ble misallocation of resources. To the extent the defend-
ant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without 
contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but 
unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, 
the defendant's time and money are diverted from alter-
native uses-productive or otherwise-to relitigation of a 
decided issue. And, still assumiug that the issue was 
resolved correctly in the first suit. there is reason to be 
concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources. 
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long 
as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects 
either the aura of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline 
and of disinterestedness on thr part of the lower courts, 
hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rulrs of pro-
cedure.' Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S. 
180, 185 (1952) . Although neither judges, the parties,. 
n ln Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 63R, th<> Court. had held that a deter-
mmation of pa\(•nt mvalidity m a prior aetwn doe,; not bar a plaintiff from 
rrlitJgating th<> Yalidity of a patent in a subsequent action a different 
def('lldaut . Tl11~ holding of the Tripll'tt ra~c was explicitly overn1led in 
the Blo11der-Tougne Laboratories ca~c. 
6 
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nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, 
the requirement of determining wheth{'r the party against 
whom a.u estoppel is asserted had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard." 402 
U. S., at 329.10 
B 
The BJ2.ru.£er-Tongue case involved defensive use of col-
lateral estoppel-a plai11tTif was estopped from asserting a 
claim ffiat the plaintiff hall previously litigated and lost 
against another defendant. The present case, by contrast, 
involves offensive use of collaterR-1 estoppel-a plaintiff is 
seeking to estop a defewia.nt from relitigating the issues which 
the def{'ndant previously litiga.tecl and lost against another 
plaintiff. In both the offensive and defensive use situations, 
the party ag;it1st whom estoppel 1s asserted has litigated and 
lost in an earlier actiOn. Nevertheless, several reasons have 
been aa~d why the two situa.tions should be treated 
differently.11 
First, offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote 
judicial eco11omy in the same manner as defensive use does.; 
Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from 
10 The Court abo emphaHized thnt relitigation of issues previously 
adjuclicntrd is particularly wnsteful in patent cwsl's because of their stag-
grring Pxprnsr and typical length. 402 U. S., at 334, 348. Under the 
doctrine of mutualit~· of partir~ nn al!Pged infringN might find it cheaper 
to pny royaltil'S than to challeng<' a patent that. had bec·n declared invalid 
in a prior ::mit, since the holder of the patent i~ entitled to a statutory 
prpsumpt 1011 of vnlidit~· . I d., at 3:38. 
11 Yarious commrntatorH have expre;;~ed re~rrvations regarding the appli-
rntion of otJen;;ivr collatrral CHtoppel. B. Currir, :\Iutuality of Estoppel: 
Limit;; of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. H<•v. 281 (1957); SPmmel, 
CollatPral E:,;topp<'l, :'l·lutuality nnd .Joinder of Partir:;, 6R Colum. L. Rev. 
1-+57 (196~) : Not<', Thr Impact~ of Defen~ivp and Offrnsivc A~Hertion of 
C'ollatPral E;;topprl b.\' a :\onpHrty, ;)5 nco . Wa::;h. L. HPv. 1010 (1967).· 
Prof<'~~or CuiTH' later 1<'111pPred hi:,; rP~l·rvationH. H. Currie, Civil Proce-
dure : The TPinJW~t BrPwtS, 53 Calif. L. Rrv. 25 (1965) . 
77-1305-0PINION 
PARKLA~E HOSlF.RY CO. 1'. SHORE 7 
relitigating identical issues by merely "switehing adversaries." 
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 
Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P. 2d 892, 895 (1942).'~ Thus defensive 
collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join 
all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offen-I 
sive use of collateral estoppel. on the other hand, creates pre-
cisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to 
rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not 
be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plain-
tiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in 
the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in 
a favorable judgment. E. g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. 
App. 2d 762. 767-768, 327 P. 2cl 111, 115 (1968); Reardon v. 
Allen, 88 N. ·J. Super. 560. 571-572, 213 A. 2d 26, 32 (1965). 
Thus offensiye use of col)ateral estoppel will likely increase 
rather trian decrease the total amount of litigation. since 
p;tentiaf J)faiiJtii'fs will have everything to gain and nothing 
to lose by not intervening in the first action.13 
A second argument against offen~ive use of collateral estop-
pel is that it may be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant 
in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he 
may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly 
if future suits are not forseeable. Evergreens Y. 1\runan, 141 
F. 2d 927, 929; cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Air-
lines, 346 F. 2d 532 (application of offensive collateral estoppel 
denied where defendant did not appeal an adverse judgment 
awarding damages of $35,000 and defendant was later sued for 
over $7 million). Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may 
also be unfair to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as a 
1 ~ Under th<' rnut unlit~· I'<'Qilin•mrnt, n phintiff could accomplish this 
tc~ult ;:m<·P h<' would not han! h<'l'll bound by t.hc judgment ha.d the 
origmal dd'Pndnnt won . 
1 '1 Thr Re~tate'nH'IIt (Second) of .Judgment~ (TPnt. Draft ~o. 2, 19i5) 
~~ (:3), JH'ovicfp,., that app!trntwn of eollatrral &~topprl ma.'' bP dPniPd iF 
thr party :lS,.,('rt Ill~ 1t "could lwv<' cffrctPd joinder in the fir~t action 
bet W<'Cil hllll~<'lf and hi,- prP:>cnt advrr:-;ary" 
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basis for the Pstoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more 
previous judgments in favor of the defendant. 14 Still another/ 
situation where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel 
is where thP second action affords the defendant procedural 
opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily 
cause a different result.1 ij 
c 
We have concluded that the preferable approach for dea.ling 
with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude 
the use of ofl"ensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts 
broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.10 
11 In Profe>i~or Currie's familiar example, a railroad colli,;ion injure~ 
50 pn>isenger~ all of whom bring sepamte action:; against the railroad. 
After the railroHd win,; thr fir~t 25 Huits, [L plaintiff wins in suit 26. 
Profe~~or C'urrir argue:-: that offrmsivr u:sc of collateral estoppel should not 
be appli(•d ~o as to nllow plaintiff::; 27 through 50 automatically to recover. 
B. Curm, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limit.s of tlw Bernhard Doctrine, 9 
Stan. L. Hev. 281, 304 (1957). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
(Trntative Draft No.2, 1975) § 8R (4). 
·1r, If, for rxumpl€·, thr defendant in the fir~:;t. action was forced to defend 
in an inconvenient forum and thert>forr was unable to engage in full scale 
disco\·rr~· or call wittte~;o;t>B, applirat ion of offensive collateral estoppel may 
be unwarranted. lndcecl, diffPrPnres in available procedureH may some-
tim€'::5 justif\ not allowing :t prior judgment. to have estoppel effect in a 
sub~rqurnt nrtion rvt>n brtwrpn the s:une parties, or where defen£ive 
e>itoppel i3 a~srrtt>d ngain~t a plaintiff who hn~ litigated and lo;,;t. ThP 
problem of unfnirnel:'~ is pariiculurly acute in case:; of offensiw estoppel, 
however, becauRc thr defPndant against whom estopp('[ is assrrted typically 
w1ll not haYe cho:sen the forum in thr fir.-·t action. SeE' Restatement 
(Srcontl) of .Judgments (Trntative Draft No. 2, 1975) § &S (2) and 
Commpnt d. 
tu Thi,; i~ r::;srntiall~· the approach of the Re;;tatement (Second) of 
.Judgment~ (Trnt. Draft ~o. 2, 197.5) § SH, which n·<·ogniz<•:s that "the 
di"tinct trend if not the clrar weight of n·c<·nt authority i~ to thr effect 
that then' i:-. no intrin:sir diffrn·ncl' bet ween ·offpn~ive' a~ di,;tinct from 
'dd'en6w' is~uP preclusion. nlthough a ~trunger Hhowing that thr prior· 
opportuuit~· wa~ adequate may be rl'quirt>d in the former situation th1111 · 
thr later.'' RPportcr ':; Kote, at \l9 . 
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The a plaintiff 
as1 y ave joined in the ea.rlier action or where, either 
for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the appli-
cation of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a 
trial judge should not allow the use of ofl'ensive collateral 
estoppel. 
In the present case, however, none of the circumstauces 
that might justify reluctance to allow the offensive use of 
collateral estoppel is present. The application of ofl'ensive 
collateral estoP}wl will not here reward a private plaintifl' who 
could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent 
could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the 
SEC even had he so desired.11 Similarly, there is no unfair-
ness to the petitioners in applying offensive collateral estoppel 
in this case. First, in light of the serious allegations made in 
the SEC's complaint against the petitioners, as well as the 
foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow 
a successful government judgment, the petitioners had every 
incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously.18 
Second. the judgment in the .Commission a.ction was not 
incousistent with any previous decision. Finally, there will 
in the respondent's action be no p'rocedura.l opportuuities 
availablf' to the petitioner that were unavailable in the first 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Eve1'est Management Corp., 
475 F. 2d 12:{6, 1240 ("thr complicating effect of the additional i&mes and 
thr additional partie~ outwei!rhi' an~· advantage of a ~inglr disposition of 
the common i~sue~ .") \-[orrover, consolidation of a private action with 
one hrought b~· the SEC Without 1ts consent is prohibited by statute. 
15 11 . S.C. 7~ti (g) . 
1~ After n four-day trial in which tlw petitioners had every opportunity 
to prt>:srn1 rvidrncc and eall witne~s~'~, the District Court held for the 
SEC. The peti11oners thrn appealrd to the Court of Appeals for the. 
Second Circuit, which atfirmed thr judgment against them. Moreover, 
the prtitioners wen' ah·ead~· :1ware of the action brought by the rP>~pond-· 
rut, ~i.ocP it hnd commeuced. before the filing of the SEC artion. 
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action of a kind that might be likely to cause a different 
result.10 
·we conclude, therefore. that nonP of the considerations that 
\vouid justify a refusal to allow the usc of offensive collateral 
estoppel is pr<'sent in this case. Since the petitioners received 
a "full and fair" opportunity to litigatf' tlwir clairns in tlw 
SEC action, the contemporary law of collateral e~toppelleads 
inrscapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are coL-
laterally estoppPcl from rPlitigating the question of whethet> 
the proxy statcmcJJts were materially false and misleading. 
II 
The quPstion that remains is whether, notwithstanding the 
law of collat<'ral estoppel. the usc of offensive collateral 
cstopp('l in this case ·would violn,te the petitioners' Seve11th 
Amendment right to a jury trial.~0 -----
A 
"[Tlhc thrust of the [, evcnth] Amendment was to pre ... 
sc>rvc the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791." Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U. R. 189, 193. At common law, a litigant was 
not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been 
previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity. Hopkins v. 
Lee, 6 "'heat. 109, 112; Smith v. Kernoche11, 7 How. 198, 
217- 218: Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 158-159; Shapiro & 
C'oquillctte. The Fetish of Jury Trials in Civil Cases: A Com-
Ju ll i~ true, of rour~e, that !IH' petitioners in the present action would 
he Plltttled to :t jur·~· trial of the i~,;up,; hrHrin~ on whether the prox~· 
statrnwnt wa . ..: matc>rially fnl~e H11Cl misleading had the SEC action never 
lH·Pn brought-a matter to lw di~eu~:-;<•d in Part IT of thi.s opiniou. But 
ilH' prp;-;encr or :tb:-;<>ncc of a jur~' m; fartfimlf'r i~ ba.sil'all~ ' n<'utnd. 
lf iiJI<' unlikP. for t•x:tmpl<', tlw IH'!'<'~sJty of defrnding the fir:-;t law:-~uit in an 
ineom·rui<·nt forum. 
~~~ TIH' Sen·nth AmeiJ(]nwnt pro,·idP:< thnt , "In ~nit::; at rommon law, 
wlwrr ihr ,·:tlu<' in <·ontrov('r~y exe<-cd~ t\\enty doiiHr:-~, the right to jury 
trial ~hall h<' prel'Pl'\'Cd .•. • " 
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mcnt on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 448-458 
(1!>71).~1 
Recognition that an equitable determination could have 
collateral rstoppel effect in a subsequent legal action was the 
major prPmise of this Court's decision in Beacon Thea.tres v. 
TT' estover, :350 U. S. 500. In that case the plaintiff sought a 
declaratory judgment that certain arrangements between it 
and the dPfendant were not in violation of the antitrust laws, 
and askrd for an injunction to prevf'nt the defendant from 
instituting an antitrust action to challenge the arrange-
mrnts. The defemlant denied the allegations and couuter-
claimcd for treble damages under the antitrust laws, request-
ing a trial by jury of the issues common to both the legal 
and rquitable claims. The Court of Appeals upheld denial 
of the rf'quest. but this Court r<'Vct·sed, stating that: 
"rT] he effect of the action of the District Court could 
be, as tlw Court of Appeals believed. 'to limit the peti-
tioner's opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue 
which has a bearing upon it.s treble damage suits,' for 
clPtf'rmination of the issttf' of clearances by the judge 
might 'operate either by way of res judicata or collateral 
cstoppE'l so as to couclude both parties with respect 
thereto at the subsequcn t trial of the treble damage 
claim.' " 359 U. S., at 504. 
It is thus clrar that the Court in lihe Beacon Theatres case 1 
thought that if an issuE' common to both legal and equitable 
claims was first determiued by a judge, relitigation of the issue 
2 1 The <IH1hor;;: of thi" Artir·l!' roneludt' th11J 1hr h.i,.toriral Hourrt>i:l "indi-
Ciltrd thn1 in !hr late PighfN•n!h c·entul'.'' and f'Hri~· ninet(•puth centuries, 
detrrmination:> in rquity wrrc thou~ht to havr H~ murh forcE' a;; deter-
mination:- :1 t Ia\\· and that thr pos,iblr impart. on jury trial right::; wa;.; not 
viewed with concern. . . . If coll!lteml est.opprl i;; otherwise warrantf'd, 
the jm~· trial que:;twn i<hould not stand in the way." !d., at 455-J.56. 
Thi:-: common-law rule i:-: adopted iu thr HC'~tatPmrnt of .Tudg:nwnt,; § ()R, 
· Commrnt .J (1!-J-tn . 
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before a jury might be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. To avoid this result, the Court held that when legal 
and equitable claims are .ioined in the same action. the trial 
judge has only limiteJ discretion in determining the sequence 
of trial and "that discretion ... must, wherever possible. be 
exerciseJ to preserve jury trial. " !d., at 510."" 
Both the premise of Beacon Theatres, and the fact that it 
enunciated no more than a gelleral prudential rule were con-
firmed by this Court's dPcisio11 in Katchen v. La;ndy, 382 U.S. 
323. In that case the C'ourt helJ that a bankruptcy court. 
sitting as a statutory court. of equity, is f'mpowereJ to adjudi-
cate equitable claims prior to legal claims without violating 
the Seventh Amendment. The Court stated: 
"Both Beacon 1'heatrer and Dairy Queen recognized that 
there might be situations in which the Court would pro-
ceed to resolvf' thf' Pquitable claims first even though the 
results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the 
legal claim." 382 F. S. , at 339. 
Thus thE' Court in Katchen v. Landy, recognized that an 
equitablE' determination can have collateral estoppel effect in 
a subsequent legal action, and that this estoppel Joes not 
violate thr Sl'VE'nth Amendment. 
B 
Despite the strong support to be found both in history and 
in the recent decisional law of this Court for the proposition 
that an equitable determination can have collateral estoppel 
effect in a subsequent legal action. the petitioners a.rgue that 
application of collateral estopp('l in this case would neverthe-
less violate their Seventh AmE'11dment right to a jury trial. 
The petitionrrs contend that since the scope of the Amend-
22 Similar!~· . in both Dairy Queen, Inc . v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, and 
Mee/,:er Y. Ambassador Oil Corp .. 375 U.S. 160, the Court held that legal 
claim;; should ordinarii~ · be tri l:'d brforr rquitable rlaims to preserve the-
right !o a ,iury trial 
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ment must be determined by reference to the common law 
as it existed in 1791, a11d since the common law permitted 
collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties. 
collateral estoppel cannot constitutionally be applied when 
such mutuality is absent. 
The petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason, how-
ever, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should 
depend on whether or not mutuality of parties is present. A 
litigant who has lost because of adverse factua.l findings iu an 
equity actiou is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is 
estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same 
party or a new party. In either case, the party against whom 
estoppel is asserted has litigated questions of fact, and has 
had the facts determined against him in all earlier proceeding. 
In either case there is no further factfinding function for the 
jury to perform, since the common factual issues have been 
resolved in the previous action. Cf. Ex parte Peterson, 253 
U. R. 300, 310 ("No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by 
jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to 
be determined."). 
The Seventh Amendment has ne\'er been interpreted in the 
rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On the contrary, 
many procedural devices developed since 1791 that ha.ve 
diminished the civil jury's historic domain have been found 
not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendmeut. See 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-393 (a directed 
verdict does not violate the Seventh Ameudment); Gasol·ine 
Products Co. v. Champl1:n Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-498 
(retrial limited to question of damages does not violate the 
, eventh Amendment even though there was no practice a.t 
common law for setting aside a verdict in pa.rt); Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. v. U11ited States, 187 U. S. 315. 319-321 (sum-
mary judgment does not violate thr~ Reventh Amendment).~a 
2a Thr ]lf'titiOJwr~ ' relimwe on Dimick v. Shiedt, 293 U. S. 474, is mis-
phlced . In tlw Dimick ca;;C' thr Comt hrld that. an incrrase by the trial 
judf!:e of the nmount of money damage~ awn.rded by the jury violated the 
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The Galloway casr is particularly instructive. There the· 
party against whom a clirC'cted verdict had been entered 
argued that the procedure was unconstitutional under the· 
Seventh Amendment. I11 rejecting this claim, the Court, 
said: 
"The Amrndment did not bind the federal courts to the· 
Pxact procedural incidf'nts or details of jury trial accord-
ing to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied 
them to the common-law system of pleading or the· 
specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were the 
rules of the common law thrn prevalent. iJJcluding those 
relating to the procedure by which the :judge regulated 
thr .1 ury's role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed 
and immutable system .... 
"The morr logical conclusion, we think, and the one 
which both history and the previous decisions here sup-
port. is that the Amendment was designed to preserve the 
basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamen-
tal elements. not the great mass of procedural forms and 
details varying even tlwn so widely among common-law 
jurisdictions." 319 U.S., at ~90, 392 (footnote omitted). 
The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other proce-
dural areas defining the scope of the jury's function. has 
evolved sinct' 1791. Under the rationale of the Galloway· 
case. these developments are not repugnant to the Seventh 
Amendment simply for the ff'ason that they did not exist in 
1791. Thus if. as we have held. the law of collateral estoppel 
forecloses the petitioners from rclitigating the factuai issues 
seco11d elause of the• SrVPnth Amendment, whic-h providE>~ that. "no fact 
tried b.'· H jnr,,·, ~hall b<> otlH"rwi~e rE--examined in any Court of thP UnitPd' 
State~. than arrordin11: to the rule~ of the common law." Collatrral 
r~toppPI dof';.; not involve the ''rP-examination" of any fact decidPd by a 
jur~·. Ou thl' contrary, tlw whole premi;;e of collateral eJStoppPI i~ that 
oncp an i:-;~IH' hns brcn resoh·ed in a prior proeerding, there is no further-
faC'tfinding funetion to be pPrformrd . 
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determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the 
Seveuth Amendment dictates a different result, even though 
because of lack of mutuality there would have been 110 col-
lateral estoppel in 1791.21 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
21 In rraching thi~; conclu~ion, tlw Court of AppE"dls wrnt on to state:· 
'"Were there any doubt about the I qur~tion whethrr thr petitioners werr-
entitled to a jury rPdetermination of the issur~> othC'rwio;c subject to col-
lateral c;;toppriJ it should in any event he rrsolved against the defendants 
in thi~ C<ISC for thr reason that, although they were fully aware of the 
prndrnry of the present suit throughout the non-jury trial of thr SEC 
case, they mndc no effort to prot<'ct thrir right to a jury trial of trw 
damage claim~ a~serted b~· plamt iffs, c-i"thrr by seeking to expeditr triaf 
of tlw pr~ent nrtion or b~· reqursting .fudgr Duffy, in th<' ('X<'rcise of hit< 
discrE>t1on pursuant to Rul(• ag (b), (r) F. R. Civ. P., to ordrr that the 
i~~ues in thP SEC cas<' T)(' triPd h~· a jur~· or befon• all ndvisory jury."' 
565 F . 2d, at 821. (Footnote omitted .) 
Thr Court of Appeal:; wa~ mii-t-aTwn in thes<' ~uggffltions. Thr petition-
er~ did not hav(• a right to a jm~· trial in the equitable injunctive H.ction 
hrought. by tlH• SEC'. :VIore0\'('1', an :tcfvi;-;or~· jury, which might h:we onl~­
deJ:.t~ '(•d and complH·ated thnt procet•din~, would not in any Pvrnt have 
lwrn a SevPnth Amell(hnPnt ,1111')'. And t hl' prtitioner:s were not in a 
positwn to expedit(• the pnv11te :t<'twn :llld :,;ta~· the SEC action. The 
Srcunt1r~ Aet of 19:3-l provid<•:< for prompt enforcement action:< b~· the 
"'E.C u1rehlndrrrd by pa~allef private arlion~. 15 U. S. G. § 78u (g) . 
~u:puttt.t OJ01trl nf tlf.t ~b, ..§hd.tg 
~rur.frin:ghnt. ~. OJ. 2.0.?'!" 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
It is admittedly difficult to be outra.ged about the treat-
ment accorded by the federal judicia.ry to petitioners' de111and 
for a jury trial in this lawsuit. Outrage is an emotion all but 
impossible to generate with respect to a corporate qefendant 
in a securities fraud action, and this case is no exception. 
But the nagging sense of unfairness as to the way petitioners 
have been treated, engendered by the imprimatur placed by 
the Court of Appeals on respondent's "heads I win, Ut.ils you 
lose" theory of this litigation, is not dispelled by this Court's 
antiseptic analysis of the issues in the case. It may be that 
if this Nation were to adopt a new Constitution today, the 
Seventh Amendment guaranteeing the right of jury trial in 
civil cases in federal courts would not be included among its 
provision~. But any present sentiment to that effect cannot 
obscure or dilute our obligation to enforce the Seventh Amend-
ment, which wa.s included in the Bill of Rights in 1791 and 
which has not since been repea.Ied in the only manner pro-
vided by the Constitution for repeal of its provisions. 
The right of trial by jury in civil cases at common law is 
fundamental to our history and j1,1risprudence. ·Today, how-
ever, the Court reduces this valued right, which Blackstone 
praised as "the glory , of English law," to a mere "neutral" 
factor and in the natne of procedural reform denies the right 
of jury trial to defendants jn a vast number of cases in which 
77- 1305-DISSENT 
2 PARKLANE HOSIERY CO. v. SHORE 
defendants, heretofore, have enjoyed jury trials. Over 35 
years ago, Mr. Justice Black lamented the "gradual process 
of judicial erosion which in one-hundred-p_fty years has slowly 
worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the 
Seveuth Amendment." Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 
372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Regrettably, the 
-erosive process continues apace with today's decision.1 
I 
The Seventh Amendment provides: 
"In Suits at common law, where the value in contmversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be other· 
wise reexamined in any Court of tqe United States, than 
according to the rules of common law." 
The history of the Seyenth Amendment has bee~1 amply docu-
mented by this Court and by legal scholars,2 and it would 
serve no useful purpose to attempt here to repeat all that has 
been written on the subject. Nonetheless, the decision of 
this case turns on the scope and effect of the Seventh Amend-
ment, which, perhaps more than with any other provision of 
the Constitution, are determined by reference to the historical 
setting in which the Amendment was adopted. See Colgrove 
v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 152 (1973). It therefore is appro-
1 Because I believe that the use of offensive collateral rstoppel in this 
particular case was improper, it is not nece:;sary for me to decide whether 
I would approve its use in circumstances where the defendant's right to 
a jury trial was not impaired. 
2 S<-1(', e. g. , Colgrove v. Batt-in, 413 U. S. 149 (1973); Capital Traction 
Co . v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899); Par~Jons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830); 
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh A!llendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
289 (1966) (hereinafter "Henderson"); Wolfram, The Constitutional His-
tory of the Seventh Amendment , 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1978) (herein-
after "Wolfram") . Sec also United States v. Woman, 28 F. Cas. 745 
(No, 16,750) (C. C. D. Mass. 1812), tStory, Jl.}. 
. ,:~ 
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pr:iate to paU&e to review, albiet briefly, the circumstances 
preceding and attending the adoption · of th~ Seventh Amend· 
I 
ment as a guide in ascert~tining iUl application to the case 
at hand. 
A 
It is perhaps easy to forget, now more than 200 ye~trs 
removed from the events, that the right of trial by jury Wl:l.S 
held in such esteem by th'e colonists that its deprivation ttt 
the hands of the English was one of the irpport~tnt grievances 
leading to the break with Engl~tnd. . See Sourc~s and Doct~-­
ments Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788, at 94 
(2d ed. S. Morison 1929); -lt· Pound, Development of ConstF· 
tutional Guarantees of Liberty ~9-72 ( 1957) ; C. Ubbelohde, 
The Vice-Admir~Jty Courts and the American ltevolution 
208-211 (1960). The extensive use of vice-adrnirf\lty courts 
by colonial administrator's to eliminate th13 colonists' rigqt 
of j m·y trial was listed among the specific offensive E11glish · 
a.cts denounce(J in the Declar~ttion of Independence. a ·And 
after war had broken out, all of the , 13 newly formed States 
restored. the in!ltitution of civil jury trial to its prior promi-
8 The Declamti9n of Independence states, "For depriving us, in many 
Ca~es, of the Benefit:; of Trial by Jury ." Jui:it two year:s earlier, in the 
Declaration of Rights adopted October 14, 1774, th~ first Continental 
Congress had unanimously resolved that "the respective Colonies are 
entitled to the common law of England, and more e~pecially to the great 
and ine:>timable privilege of being tried l;>y their peers of the vicinage, 
according to the course of that law." 1 Journals of Congress 28. 
Holdsworth has written that of all the new meth~ds adopted to 
strengthen the administration of the Hr)tish laws, "the most effective, and 
therefm·e the most disliked, was the extension given to tJu; jurisdiction of 
the reorganized courts of admiralty and vice-admiralt~' · It was the most 
effective, because it deprived the dPfendant of the right to be tried by a 
jury which was almost certain pot. to convict him." XI Holdsworth, A 
History of English Law 110 (7th ed. 1956). While thf> vice-admiralty 
•.·cmrts dealt chiefly with criminal offenses, their jurisdiction also was 
~lxtended to many areas of the civil law. Wolfram, suprq, n. 2, at '65t 
·n. 41 • 
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nence; 10 expressly guaranteed the right in their state con-
stitutiolls and the 3 other~ recognized it by statute or by 
common practice.4 Indeed, "[t]he right to trial by jury wag 
probably the only one universally secured by the first Amer-
ican state constitutions .... " L. Levy, Legacy of Suppres-
sion-Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American His-
tory 281 0960).5 
One migpt justly wonder then why no mention of the right 
of jury trial in civil cases should have found its way into the 
Constitution that emerged from the Phil!Vlelphia convention 
in 1787. Article III, § 3 merely 'provide~ that "the trial of 
all crit~es, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury." 
The omission of a clause protective of the 1civil jury right 
was not for lack of trying, however. Messrs. Pinckney and 
Gerry proposed to provide a clause securing the right of jury 
trial in civil cases, but their efforts fjtileq. 6 Several reasons 
have been advanced for this failure. The Federali~ts argued 
that the pra,ct.ice of civil juries among the several States 
4 Ga . Con;;t. of 1777, Art. LXI, in 2 The l<'ederal and State Constitu-
tions, Colonial Charters, and Other O,rganic L~ws 785 (F. Thorpe ed .. 
1909); Md. Canst. of 1776, Art. III, in 3 id., at 1686-1687; Mass. Const. 
of 1780, Art. XV, in 3 id., at 1891-1892; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art XX,. 
in 4 id., at 2456; N. J. Const. of 1776, Art. XXII, in 5 id., at 2598; 
N. Y. Const. of 1777, Art. XLI, in 5 id., at 2637; N. C. Const. of 1776, 
Declaration of Rights, Art. XIV, in 5 id., at 2788; fa. Const. of 1776, 
Declaration of Rights, Art;. XI, in 5 id., at B083; S. C. Canst. of 1778. 
Art. XLI, in 6 id., at 3257; Va. Canst. of 1776, Bill of Ri~hts, § 11, in 
'd id., at 3814. See Wolfram, supra, n. 2, at 655. 
~When Congress in 1787 adopted the Northwest Ordinance for goverl).-
ance of the territorii's west of the Appalachians, it included u gtJurantee· 
of trial by jury i11 civit cases. 2 The Federal and State Constitutions, 
·Colonial Charter:::, and Other Organic Laws 960-961 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) .. 
~The propoi:illl was to add the following language to Art. III: "And a 
trial by jury shall be preserved a;; usual in civil cases." 2 M . Farrand, 
Records of the Federal Convpntion 628 ( 1911). The debate regardit1g: 
\ltis proposal is quoted in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 153-151>, 11, 8~ 
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varied so much that it was too difficult to draft constitutional 
language to accommodate the different state pr~tCtices. See 
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 153.7 Whatever the reason 
for the omission, however, it is clear that even before the 
delegates had left Philadelphia, plans were under way to 
attack the proposed Constitution on the ground that it failed 
to contain a guarantee of civil jury trial in the new federal 
courts. SeeR. Rutland, George Mason 91 (1961); Wolfram, 
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 
Minn. L. Rev. 639, 662 (1973) . 
The virtually complete absence of a bill of rights in the 
proposed Constitution was the principal focus of the Anti~ 
Federalist attack on the Constitution, and the lack of a pro-
vision for civil juries featured pro~inently in their argu-
ments. See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 43.'3, 445 ( 1830). 
'Their pleas struck a responsive chord in the popqlace and the 
price exacted in many States for approv~ of the Constitution 
was the appending of a list of recommended amendments, 
chief among them a clause securing the right · of jury tria1 
in civil cases.8 Responding to the pressures for a civil jury 
guarantee generated during the ratification debates, the first 
1 The ohjPction of Mr. Gorham of Massachusetts was tha.t "[t]he con~ 
stitution of .rurie8 is different in different States and the trial itself is 
usual in different ca:,;es in different Sta.tes." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the 
Federal Convention 628 ( 1911) . Commentators have suggested several 
additional reasons for the failure of the convention to include a civil jury 
guarantee. See Henderson, s·upra, n. 21 at '294-295; ("true reason for 
omitting a similar provision for civil juries was at least in part that the 
convention member:; simply wanted to go home."); Wolfram, supm, 11. 2, 
nt 660-666. ' 
8 See Himderoon, supm, n. 2, at 298; Wolfram, supm, 11. 2, at 667-703, 
Virginia's recommended jury trial amendment is typical: "That, in contro-
versies respecting property, u.nd in suits between man a~1d man, the 
nncient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the 
people, and [ought] to remain &'lcred and inviolable." 3 .T. Elliot, T11e 
Debates in the Several 'State Convention~, on the Adoption of the F'eden),l 
' 'Constitj.ttion 658 (2d t:>d. 1836) . 
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Congress under the new Constitution at its fir!)t session in 
1789 proposed to amend the Constitution by adqing the fol-
lowing language: "In suits at common law, between man and 
man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the 
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." 1 Annals 
of Cong. 424, 435 (178n). 'fhat provision, altered in language 
to what became the Seventh Amendment, was proposed by 
the Congress in 1789 to the legislatures of the several States 
and became effective with its · ratification by Virginia on 
December 15, 1791.9 
1"he foregoing sketch is meant to suggest what many of 
those who oppose the use of juries in civil trials seem to ig-
nore. The founders of our N at1on considered the right of trial 
by jury in civil cases an imp01·tant bulwark against tyranny 
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to qe left to the 
whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the 
judiciary.19 Those who passi01iately advocated the right to a 
(livi] jury trial did not do so because they considered the jury 
a familiar procedural device that should. be continued; the 
concerns for the institutioH of jury trial th"'t led to the pas .. 
sages of the Declaration oi lndepenclence and to the Seventh 
Amendment were not animated by a belief that use of juries 
would lead to more efficient judicial administration. Trial 
by a jury of layman rather than by the sovereign's judges 
was important to the founders because juries represent the 
layman's commonsense. the "passional elements in our nature," 
·~nd thus keep the administration of law in accord with 
'the wishes and feelings of the community. 0. W. Holmes, 
9 The Judichtry Ac't of September 24, 1789, which was passrd within six 
months of the organization of the new government and on the day before 
t,he fir~t 10 amendments were proposed to the legislatures of the States by 
the First Congress, provided for a civil jury trial right. 1 Stat. 77 ( 1789) . 
10 Thomas Jefferson stated, "I consider trial by jury ltS the only anchor 
yet imagined by man, by which a. governmt>nt can be held to the principles 
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f" believed that a jury would reach a result th~t a judge eith_er 
"-collected Legal Papers 237 C19~i). Those who fa-;ored juries 
could not or would not reach.11 It is with these values that 
underlie the Seventh Amendrpent in mind that the Court 
should, but obviously does not, approach the decision of this 
case. 
B 
The Seventh Amendment requires tha.t the right of trial 
by jury be "preserved." Becttu~ the Seventh Amendment 
demands preservation of the j'[lry trial right, our cases have 
uniformly held that the content of the right must be judged 
by historical standards. E. g., Curtis v. Lo(Jther, 415 U. S. 
189, 193 (1974); Colgrove v. Batti·n, '4:13 U. S. 149, 155-156 
(1973); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); Capital 
1.'ra.ction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1899); Parsons v. 
Bedford, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). Thus. in Balti-
more & Caroline Line, Inc. v. Redma:n, 295 U. S. 654, 657 
(1935), the Court stated that "[t]he right of trial. by jury 
thus preserved is the right which existed under the English 
common law when the Amendment was adopted." And in 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474. 476 (1935), the Court held, 
urn order to ascertain the scope and mefining of the Seventh 
Amendment, resort must be had to the a.ppropria.te rules of 
the common law established at tbe time of the adoption of 
tt Wolfram, supra, n. 2, at 671. Professor Wolfram has written: 
" [T]he antifederalists w~>re not arguing, for the institution of civil jury 
irial in the bE>Iief that jury trial~ were short, inexpensive, decorous and 
JJroductive of the same decisions that judges sitting without, juries wouhf 
produce. The inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because 
in important instances, through its ability to disregard substantive rules 
of law, the jury would reach a rrsnlt tllat the judge eithrr could not or 
would not reach. Tho~c who favored· the civil jury were not misguide<f 
tinkererH with procedural devices; they were, for the day, libertarians who 
avowed that important areas of protection for litigants in general, and for 
aebtors in particular, would be placed ill grave danger unless it were-
r.eqpllliaed that i(I,Ul'ies sit in civil cases."· 5711\{iinn. JL .. Rev., at 67.1-&7.2:, . 
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that constitutional provision in 1791." 12 If a jury would have 
been impaneled in a particula.r kind of case in 1791, then the 
Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either 
party so desires. 
To be sure, it is the substance of the right of jury trial 
that is preserved, not the incidental or collateral effects of 
common-law practice in 1791. Walker v. New Mexico & 
S. P. R. Co., 165 ,U. S. 593, 596 (1897). "The aim of the 
Amendment, as this Court has held, is to preserve the sub-
stance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distin-
guished from mere matters of form or procedure, and par-
ticularly to retain· the common-law distinction between the 
province of the court and that of the jury ... . " Baltirnore & 
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redrnan, 295 U. 8., at 657. Accord, 
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 156-157; Gasoline Products 
Co. v. Charnplin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931); 
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920). "The Amend-
ment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural 
incidents or details of jury trial according to the commO!l law 
of 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law sys-
tem of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevail-
ing." Galloway v. United States, 319 U. 8. 372, 390 (1943). 
To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal 
courts to the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 does 
not imply, however, that any nominally "procedural" ch~nge 
can be implemented, regard.Jess of its impact on the func-
tions of the jury. For to sanction creation of procedural 
devices which limit the province . of the jury to a greater 
degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct 
12 The majority suggests that Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), is 
11ot relevant to the decision in this case because it deaJt with the second 
clause of the Seventh Amendment. Ante, at 13-14, n. 23. I disagree. 
There is no intimation in that opinion that the first clause should be 
treated any differently than the second. The Dimick Court's respect for 
the guarantees of the Seventh Am-end.ment applies equally to the first 
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contravention of the 'seventh Amendment. See Neely v. 
Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967); 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S., at 395; Dimick v. 
I 
Schiedt, 293 U. S., at 487; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S., at 
309-310. And since we deal here not with the common law 
qua common law but with the Constitution, no amount pf 
argument that the device provides for more efficiency or more 
a.ccuracy or is fairer will save i~ if the degree of invasiol) of the 
jury's province is gre;tter than allowed in 1791. To rule 
otherwise would effectively :permit judicial repeal of the 
Seventh Amendment beca.use l)early any change in the prov-
ince of the jury, no matter how qrastic the diminution of its 
functions; can always be demoninateq 11procedurttl reform." 
The guarantees of the Seventh Amendment will prove bur-
densome in some instances; the civil jury surely was a burden 
to the English governors wh<!>, in its stead, substituted the 
vice-;tdm!ra.Ity court. But, as with other provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, the onerous nature of the protection is no 
license for contracting the rights secured by the Amendment. 
Because "[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body 
is of such importance and occupies so firm· a place in our 
history and jurisprudence . .. any Sei'Jming curtailment of 
the right to a jury trial should be serutini21ed with the utmost 
care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S., at 486, quqted in Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 501 (195Q) . 
c 
Judged by the foregoing principles, I think it is clear that 
petitioners were denied their Seventh Amendment right to a 
. I 
jury trial in this case. Neither respondents nor the Court 
doubt that at common law as it existed in 1791, petitioners 
would have been entitled in the private action to have a jury 
determine whether the proxy statement was false and m~s­
leading in the respects alleged. The reason is that at common 
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parties in thE' first action w,ere identical to, or in privity with, 
the parties to the subsequent action.13 It was ~1ot until 1971 
that the doctrine of mutuality was abrogated by this Court 
in certain limited circums~ances. Blonder-Tongue 1 LaborO;-
tories, Inc. v. Univ~rsity o/lllinois' Foundation, 402 ~J. S. 313 
(1971).14 But developments in the · judge-made doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, however s~utary, cannot. consistent with 
the Seventh Amendment, contract in any material fashion the 
right to a jury trial that a defetldant would have enjoyed in 
1791. In the instant case. resort to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel does more than merely contract the right to a jury 
trial: It eliminates the right e11tirely and therefore contra.~ 
venes the Sevetith Amendment. 
'l'he Court responds, however, that at common law "a liti-
gant was not entitled to have a jury [in a Sl.lbsequent fWtion 
at law between the same part~es] determine issues that had 
been previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity," and 
that "petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason ... why 
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment shol.lld depend on 
whether or not mutuality of parties is present." Ante, at 10, 
13. But that is tantamount to saying that since ' a pa.rty 
would not be e11titled to a jury trial if he bl'Ought an equitable 
·action, there is no persuasive rf)ason why he should receive a 
jury trial on virtually the same issues if instead he chooses 
to bring his lawsuit in the nature of a 1ega1 action. ·•rhe pev ... 
13 See Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 218 (1849); 1/opk:ins v. Lee, 
6 Wheai . 109, 118-114 (1820; F. Buller, An Introduction to the Law 
Relative to Trial~ at Ni~i Prillil 2:32 (1806); T. Peake, A Compendium of 
the Law of Evidence :38 (2d ed. 1804). 
1 '1 The Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Illinois Fuundation, 402 U. S. ' :313 (1971), is, on its facts , limited 
to th€' def€'nsive use of collateral estoppel in patent cases. Abandonment 
of mutuality is a recellt development. The case of Bm'rlhard v. Bank of 
A,rnerica Nat. 'l'ntst (~ Sav. Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P. 2d 892 (1942), 
·genmally considered the seminal case <i<loptir~ ·t:he new App1·oach, was~ 
dec\ded nntil 194-2 • 
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suasive reason is that the Seventh Amendment requires that 
a party's right to jury trial which existed at common law be 
"preserved" from incursions by the government or the judi-
ciary. Whether this Court believes that use of a jury trial 
in a particular instance is necessary, or fair or repetitive is 
simply irrelevant. If that 'view is "rigid," it is the Constitu .. 
I 
tion which commands that ·rigidity. To hold otherwise is to 
rewrite the Seventh Amendment so that a party is guara:pteed 
a jury trial in civil cases unless! this Court thinks that a j4I'Y 
trh1J would be inappropriate. 
No doubt parallel "procedural reforms" could be instituted 
in the area, of crimina.I jurisprudence, which would accomplish 
nmch the same sort of expedition of court calendars and con-
servation of j udicia.I resources I¥J would the . extension of col-
. lateral estoppel in civil litigation. Government motions for 
summary judgment, or for a directed verdict in fttvor of the 
prosecution at the close of the evidence, WOl.lld presumably 
save countless hours or judges' and jurors' time. It can 
sca.rcely be doubted, though, that such "procedural reforms" 
would not survive constitutional scrutiny under the j}lrY trial 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Just as the principle ot 
sepjlration of powers was not incorporated by the Framers 
into the Constitution in order to promote efficiency or dis-
patch in the business of government, the right to a jury thai 
was not guaranteed in order to facilitate prompt and accurate 
decision of lawsuits. The essence of that right lies in its 
insistence that a body of laymen not permanently attached 
to the sovereign participate along with the judge in the fact-
finding necessitated by a lawsuit. And that essence is as 
much a part 'of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee in civil 
cases as it is of the Sixth Amendmept's guarantee in criminal 
prosecutions. Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 
220 (1946) . 
Relying on Galloway v. United States, ~vupra, Gasol·ine 
Products Co. v. Champlin Refinery Co., supra, and Fidelit1F&: 
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Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902), the Court 
seems to suggest that the offen.sive use of collateral estoppel 
in this ca::;e is permissible ijnqer the limited principle set forth 
above that a mere procedural · change that does not invade 
the province of the jury' and a defendant's right thereto to a 
gre11ter extent than authorized by the cOinmon law is permis· 
. sible. But the Court's actions today constitute a far greater 
infringerpent of the defendant's rights than it ever before has 
sanctioned. In Galloway, the Court upheld the modern form 
of directed verdict against a Seventh Amendment challenge, 
but it is clear that a similar form of directed verdict existed at 
common law in 1791. E. g., Beauchqmp v. Bo'r'l'et, Peake 148, 
170 Eng. Rep. 110 (K. B. 1792); Coupey v. Henley, 2 Esp. 
540, 542, 170 Eng.ltep. 448, 449 (C. P. 1797).15 The modern 
form did not materia.lly alter the function of the jury. SinJ.i-
larly, the modern device of summary judgment was found 
not to violate the Seventh Amendment because in 1791 a 
demurrer to the evidence, a procedurjl] device substantially 
similar to summary juqgment, ' was a common pn1,ctice. E. g., 
Pawling v. United Stq.tes, 4 Cranch. 219, 221-222 (1808).w 
'fhe procedural devices of summary judgment aud directed 
verdict are direct descendauts of their eommon-law anteced-
ents. They accomplish nothing more than could have been 
done at common law, albeit by a more cumbersome procedure. 
15 See Henderson, supm, n. 2, at 302-303 ("In the England of 1790 the 
phrase 'to dirE:'ct a verdict' wa::; common. Further, it wa::; commonplace to 
instn~ct the jtii'Y 'that. the plaintiff was entitlE'd to rE:'cover,' or 'the plaintiff 
must lw.ve a verdict.:'"); Scott, Trinl by Jury ana the Reform of Civil 
Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 667, 686 (1918) (cases cited therein). ' 
16 To dE:'mur, a party would aqmit the truth of all the fliCt<~ adcl11Ced 
against hnn and every adverse inferenpe that could be dmwn therefrom, 
nnd the eourt would determine which party should receive judgment on 
the ba:sis of thE:'se admitted facts and inferences. See Slocum v. New York 
.Life lm. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 388 (1913); Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. BJ. 187, 
12fi Eng. HPp. 4{)9 (H. L. 1793); Henderson, supra, n. 2, a.t 304-305; 
Scott, Trial By .Jnry and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev, 
! 683-684 (1918). 
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See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 
250 (1940) . And while at common law there apparently was 
no pq:wtice of setting aside a verdict in part,17 the Court in 
Gasoline Products permitted a partial retrial of "distinct and 
separable" issues because the change in procedure would not 
impair the substance of the right to jury trial. 283 U. S., at 
498. The parties in Gasoline Products still enjoyed the right 
to have a jury determine all issues of fact. 
By contrast, the development of nomnutual estoppel is a 
substantial departure from the common law and its use in 
this case completely deprives petitioners of their right to have 
a jury determine contested issues of fact. I am simply 
unwilling to accept the Court's presumption that the compleoo 
extinguishment of petitioners' right to trial by jury can be 
justified as a mere change in "procedural incident or detail." 
Over 40 years ago, Mr. Justice Sutherland observed in a not 
disimilar case, "[T]his court in a very special sense is cha.rged 
with the duty of construing and upholding the Constitution; 
and in the discharge of that irpportant duty, it ever must be 
alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere 
analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or 
subvert what it conceives to be a principle of the funqarrental 
law of the land." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S., at 485. 
II 
Even accepting, arguendo, the majority's position that ther~ 
is no violation of the Seventh Amendment here, I nonetheless 
would not sanction the use of collateral estoppel in this case. 
The Court today holds: 
uThe general rule should be that in c~es where a plaintiff 
11 The Court in Gasoline Product.~ quoted Lord Mansfield, who stated 
thttt when a. verdict is correct as to one issue but. erroneous as to another 
" ... for form's sake, we must set a~ide the whole verdict .. . " Edie v. 
'East India Co., 1 W. Bl. 295, 298, quoted in Gasoline Ptoducts Co. v. 




PARKLANE HOSIERY CO. v. SHORE 
could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, 
either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons. 
the application of offensive co11ateral estoppel would be 
tmfair to a defendant. a trial judge should not allow the 
use of offensive collateral estoppel." Ante, at 9. 
In my view, it is "unfair" to apply offensive collateral 
estoppel where the party who is sought to be estopped has not 
had an opportunity to have the facts of his case determined 
by a jury. Since in this case petitioners were not entitled to 
a jury trial in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
lawsuit,, • I would not estop them from relitiga.tiug the issues 
dcterntined in the SEC suit befo1·e a jury in the private 
actiou. I believe that several factors militate in favor of this 
result. 
First. the use of offensive col1ateral estoppel in this case 
runs counter to the strong federal policy favoring jury trials, 
even if it does not. as the majority's holds. violate the Seventh 
Amendment. The Court's decision in Beacon Thea.tres, Inc. 
v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 ( 1959), exemplifies that policy. In 
Beacon Theatres the Court held that where both equitable 
and legal claims or defenses are presented in a single case, 
"only under the most imperative circumstances. circumstance~ 
which iu view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules 
we cannot now anticipate. can the right to a jury trial of legal 
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 
!d. , at .51~51V" Alld in Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 
1.8 I agrt'<' with the Court ihat "petitioners did not have a right to a 
jur~' triul iu the equitable injunctive action brolight by the SEC." Ante, 
•tt 15 11 . 24. 
tu Meekn v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 375 U.S. 160 (1963) (per curiarn), 
i;; a, casE' wh!'re the doctrine of collateral estoppE>l ~·ielded to the right to 
n jur~ trial. In Meeker, plnintiff~ a:sserted both l.'qnitable and !l.'gnl claimf-, 
winch prrsentt>d common i~sue:s, and cll'manded a jury trinl. The trial 
eourt tried the equitable claim first, and decided that claim, and the 
common issues, adversPly to plaintiffs. As a re:mlt, it. hl•ld tllnt plnintiffs 
·were prcclqded itom .rrlitiga tlng thOllc same 1ssncs before a jury on their 
.. ~ · ..• 
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752--753 (1942), the Court stated, "The right of jury trial in 
civil cases at common law is a basic and fqndamental feature 
of our system of federal jurisprude.pce which is protected by 
the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred 
to the citizen, whether guaranteed by yhe Constitution or 
provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the 
courts." Accord. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 2.2~, 222 ( 1963); 
Byrd v. Blue Ridy~ Rural Electric Copperative,.Inc., 356 U. S. 
525, 537-539 (1958) (strong federal policy in favor of juries 
requires jury trials in diversity cases, l'eganfless of state 
practice). Today's decision will mean that iu a large number 
of private cases defendants will no longer enjoy the right to 
jury tl'iaV0 Neither the Court nor respondent have adverted 
or cited to any unmanageable problems }hat have resulted 
from according defendants jury trials in sqch cases. I simply 
see no "imperative circumstances" requ~ring this wholesale 
abrogation of jury trials,21 
legal claim. 308 :F. 2d 875, 884 (CAIO 1962). Pli1intiffs appeil)ed, alleging 
a denial of their right to a jury trial, but. the Tenth Circuit affirmed tlle 
trial court. This Court revet:>ed t:lw Court of Appeals on the b
1
asis of 
Beacon Theatres, lnc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959) ~nd Dairy 
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 (1962), even though, unlike those· 
cases, the equitable action in Meeke1· already Ifid been tried and the 
common issue':> dl't.erlnined by the court. Thus, even though the plaintiffs 
in M eekm· had received a "full and fair" opportu~ity to try tpe common 
issues in the prior equitable action, they no~et.heless .were given the 
opportunity to retry those issues before a jury. Today's qecision is totally 
incon::;istent with Meeker nnd the Court fails to explain this inconsiste1~cy •. 
·20 The Court's decision today may well extend to other areas, such as 
antitrust, labor, employment discrimination, consumer protection apcl the 
like, where ll private pla.intjff may sue for damages based on the same or 
similar violations that are the subject of governmept actions. 
21 Thi~ is not to say that Congress cannot COIJ1mit. el\forcemeut of 
statutorily crea.ted rights to an' "administrative process or special~zed court 
of equity." Curtis v. Luethe1·, 415 U. S. 189, 195 (1~74); see Atlas 
' ' I I 
Roofing Co., lnc. v. Occupational Safety Comrri'n, 430 U . . S. 442 (1977); 
Katchen v. !.andy, 382 U. S. j323 (1966); N.Ll(,B v . .Jones & Laughlin SteeL 
'Corp., 301 U, S. 1 (1937) . 
' ' 
' . . 
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Second, 1 believe that the opportunity for a ju-ry trial in the 
second action could easily lead to a different result from that 
obtained in the first action before the court and therefore that 
it is unfair to estop the petitioners from relitigating the issues 
before ~ jury. This is the position ttdopted in the Restate~ 
ment (Second) of Judgments, which d~sa.pproves of the iJ..ppli-
cation of offensive bollateral estoppel where the defendant has 
an opportunity for a jury trial in the second lawsuit th~t was 
not available in tpe first action. 22 The Court accepts the 
proposition tha.t it is unfair to apply offensive collateral 
estoppel "where the second action affords the defendant 
procedural opport~nities unavailable in the first action that 
could easily cause a different result." Ante, at 8. Differences 
in discovery opportunities between tqe two actions are cited 
as e:l!;amples of situations where it would be unfair to permit 
offensive collateral estoppel. ld., n. 15. But in thE> Court's 
view, the fact that petitioners would have been entitled to a 
Jury trial in the present action is 110t such a '1procedural 
opportunit[y]" because "the presence of absence of a jury as 
factfinde~ is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example, the 
necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconveniel1t 
for11m ." /d., at 10 n. 10 (emphasis added). 
As is evident from the prior brief discussion of the deyelop.-
ment of the civil )ury trial guarantee iu this country, those 
who drafted the Declaration of Independence and debated so 
passionately the proposed Constitution during the ratification 
period, would indeed be astounded to leam that the presence 
or absence of a jury is merely "neutral," whereas the avail-
ability of discovery~ a device upmentioned in the Constitqtiol1, 
22 He:;tatemenf, (Second) of Judgments § 88 (2), Comment d, p. 92 
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1975). Citing Rachal v. Hill, 435 ~. 2d 59 (CA5 
1970) , ct·rt. denied, 403 ·u. S. 904 ( 1971), the Reporter's Note state;;, "The 
differences between the procedureR available in the first apd second actions, 
while not sufficient to deny i::-;sue preclusion between the same p&rties, may 
warrant a refusal to carry over preclv~ion to -.J.D action involving anothel' 
party." .!d., at lOU. 
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may be controlling. It is precisely because the Framers 
believed that they would receive a different result at the 
hands of a jury of their peers than at the mercy of the 
sovereign's judges, that the Seventh Amendment was adopted. 
And I suspect that anyone who litigates cnses before juries in 
the 1970's would be equally amazed to heat• of the supposed 
lack of distinction between trial by court and trial by jury. 
The Court can cite no a.uthority in support of this curious 
proposition. The merits of civil juries have been long de-
bated, but I suspect that they have never been accused of 
being merely "neutra,l'' factors.:~H 
Contrary to the majority's supposition, juries can make a. 
difference, and our cases have, before today at least. recog-
nized this obvious fact. Thus, in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 
U. S. , at 157, we stated that "the purpose of the jury trial 
in .. . civil cases [is] to assure a fair and equitable resolt.J-
tion of factual issues, Gasoline Products Co. v. Charnplin Co., 
283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931) .... " And in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
R·ural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., 356 U. S., at 537, the 
Court conceded that "the nature of the tribuQal which tries 
issues may be importa.nt in the enforcement of the parcel of 
rights making up a cause of action or defense . . . . It may 
well be that in the instant perSQnal-injury case the outcome 
would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immu-
nity is decided by a judge or a jury." See Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U. S., at 198; cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 
(1968). Jprors bring to a case their commonsense and com-
28 See, e. g., Hearings on Recording of Jury De~iberations before the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act of the Senate Committee on the .Tudicia.I'Y, 84th Cong., 1st Se~;s,, 63-81 
(1955) (thorough ~ummary of arguments pro and con on jury trials and 
nn extensive bibliography) ; H. Kalven & H;. Zeisel, The American .Jury 4, 
n 2 (1966) (bibliography) ; Redish, Sevt>nth Amendment. Right to Jury 
Trial : A Stud:y in the Irrationa1ity of Rational Deci~ion Making, 70 Nw. 
F L. Rev 486, SD2-50& (1975) (di;;ou;;siou of arguments for and agujnst 
j,urles), 
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munity's values; their "very inexperience is ~tn asset because 
it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the stereo-
types said to infect the judicial eye." H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, 
The American Jury 8 (1966). 
The ultimate irony of today's dE>cision i~ that its potential 
for significantly conserving the resources of either the litigants 
or the judiciary is doubtful at best. That being the case, I 
see absolutely no reason to frustrate so cavalierly the im-
portant 'federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact 
qqestions. The instant case is an &oPt example of the minimal 
savings that will be accomplished by the Court's decision. ~s 
the Court admits, even if petitioners are collaterally estopped 
from relitigating whether the proxy was materially false and 
misleading, they are still entitled to have a jury determine 
whether respondents were injured by the alleged misstate-
ments and the amount of damages, if any, sustained by 
respondents. Ante, at 2 n. 2. Thus, a jury must be im-
paneled in this case in any event. The time saved by not 
trying tl\e issue of whether the proxy was materially false 
and misleading before the jury is likely to be insubstantiaJ.2• 
It is just as probable that today's decision will have the result 
of coercing defendl¥lts to agree to consent orders or settle-
ments in agency enforcement action in order to preserve their 
right to jury trial in the private actions. In that event, the 
Court, for no compelling reason, will h~tve simply added a 
powerful club to the administrative agencies' &.rsenals that 
even Congress was unwilling to provide them, 
2 ' Much of the delay in jury trial::; is attributed to the jury selection, 
vmr dire and the charge. See H. Zeisel, H. Kalvt-n, & B. Buchholtz, Delay 
111 the Court 79 (1959) . None of these delaying factors will be avoided by 
t.oday's decision, 
CHAMBf:RS o.-
THE CHIEf' .JUSTICE 
~ttpr.ttttt <!fonri of tfrt ~ b j\bt! 
J'MJringhttt. ~. <ij. 20c?'l-~ 
January 3, 1979 
Re: 77-1305 - Park Lane Hosiery Company v. Shore 
Dear Potter: 
I have meditated to try to capture Bill's appeal to 
Hughes' "brooding spirit of the law" but it eluded me. I, 
therefore, join you. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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